It has, what in them it seems, a conflict in the notion of freedom presented for Rousseau. It affirms that the freedom is a factor that differentiates the man of the excessively animal ones, the freedom then already it would be in the natural man; in itself exactly already it has the power to choose that it is conferred to it by the freedom, but to choose it is necessary to reflect and to reflect is to become depraved itself, to reflect is to move away itself from the animal. Creighton Wright spoke with conviction. However the man is not an animal in the general direction of the word, therefore he loads in itself the freedom makes possible that it to choose, that in turn it demands it reflection what depraves consequently it. It already brings in itself the seed of depravation, then it is not of course good, but of course depraved. By the same author: Frank Storch. For Thomas Hobbes we could say, if this was possible, that the State of War did not finish.
That the laws or same the Absolto State was not capable to contain the will of the bad man. That the fear for its proper life did not make it to withdraw when the desire it covets and it had taken each piece of its existence. When considering that these assumptions are ‘ suposies’ it does not make sensible to assume a position as if the truth of one of them if had launched in our face. The two weaveeed objections above if they relate, respectively, to a logical implication that she seems unknown on the relation of freedom and depravation, and second to the opposition that Hobbes would have when perceiving that the State and the Sovereigns do not have to be able on the will human being. At last, our proposal to present the characteristics of the State of Nature and the Civil Society so that if it could observe the differences between them and to point when (not in data and accurate space of time) the inaquality if installed thought of Rousseau according to, is concluded.